GEOGRAPHY
Size: North Korea occupies about 55 percent of total land area
of the Korean Peninsula, or approximately 120,410 square kilometers of
land area; it is about the size of the state of New York or Louisiana.
Topography: Approximately 80 percent of land area mountain ranges
and uplands. All mountains on peninsula over 2,000 meters high are in North
Korea.
Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers.
Approximately 60 percent of rainfall falls in June through September.
TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Transportation: Reconstruction of system destroyed during Korean
War complete, but lags behind economic needs.
Railroads: Total railroad network as of 1990 approximately 5,000
kilometers (8,500 kilometers claimed), primarily along east and west coasts.
Almost 3,200 kilometers electrified; more being electrified and built.
Roads: Road network estimated between 23,000 and 30,000 kilometers
(75,500 kilometers claimed) in 1990, almost all gravel, crushed stone,
or dirt; remainder paved.
Ports: Port facilities at Ch'ngjin, Haeju, Hamh ng, H ngnam,
Najin, Namp'o, Sonbong, Songnim, and Wnsan.
Civil Aviation: Approximately fifty-five airports, all usable;
about thirty permanent surface runways; less than five runways over 3,659
meters. International airport at Sunan, north of P'yongyang.
Telecommunications: Domestic and international communications
controlled through Propaganda and Agitation Department of Korean Workers'
Party. Radio service from approximately two dozen AM and ten FM government-controlled
stations in 1993; nearly all households have access to broadcasts from
radios or public loudspeakers. Television transmission widespread; eleven
television stations. Wide range of official publications.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Political System: Communist state under leadership of Kim Il
Sung, general secretary of ruling Korean Workers' Party (KWP)and president
of state, elected May 1990. Power centralized in hands of Kim Il Sung ("great
leader"), son Kim Jong Il ("dear leader"), and select few holding positions
on three-member Standing Committee of twenty-member Political Bureau (elected
to five-year terms under 1992 revision of 1972 constitution; as of September
1992, thirteen full members; seven candidate members), inner council of
303-member KWP Central Committee (as of September 1992, 160 full members,
143 alternate members). Preeminence of party control (estimated 3 million
members) unchallenged and as of mid-1993 no discernible signs of internal
opposition to Kim Il Sung's absolute authority. Members of Supreme People's
Assembly, unicameral legislature, also elected to five-year terms (as revision
to 1972 constitution) in May 1990, with power to elect and recall authority
of chairman, National Defense Commission, on president's recommendation;
universal suffrage age seventeen. Constitution revised April 1992 at Supreme
People's Assembly; text released in November 1992 by South Korean press.
Nominally Marxist-Leninist in doctrine, but since mid-1970s, chuch'e, indigenous
doctrine, promotes ideology of national self-reliance.
Administrative Divisions: 1972 constitution provides a two-tier
system: nine provinces and three provincial-level special cities under
direct central control; seventeen ordinary cities under provincial control.
Judicial System: Three-level judicial system patterned after
Soviet model: Central Court at top, provincial courts at intermediate level,
and people's courts at lowest level. Prosecutors grouped under separate,
parallel chain of command topped by Central Procurator's Office, which
supervises local procurators' offices at provincial and county levels.
Foreign Affairs: End of Cold War, break-up of Soviet Union, and
changes in international political scene affected traditional alliances
with China and Soviet Union.
Inter-Korean Relations: Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchanges, and Cooperation signed 1991 defines basic relations between
the two Koreas in transition period to peaceful unification. Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula effective 1992 under the
North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee allows for mutual inspection
of nuclear facilities.
International Memberships: Admitted to United Nations in 1991;
maintains permanent mission in New York and participates in activities
of many of its specialized agencies as well as those of other international
organizations. Observer status at International Monetary Fund.
The Army
Over 90 percent of all KPA personnel in 1992--more than 1 million troops--were
in the ground forces, the North Korean army. Ground forces in 1960 may
have totalled fewer than 400,000 persons and probably did not rise much
above that figure before 1972. The force expanded relentlessly over the
next two decades; in 1992, there were approximately 1 million personnel.
The size, organization, disposition, and combat capabilities of the army
give P'yongyang military options both for offensive operations to reunify
the peninsula and for credible defensive operations against any perceived
threat from South Korea.
The army is largely an infantry force although a decade-long modernization
program has significantly improved the mobility and firepower of its active
forces. Between 1980 and 1992, North Korea reorganized, reequipped, and
forward deployed the majority of its ground forces. The army places great
emphasis on special operations and has one of the largest special operations
forces in the world--tailored to meet the distinct requirements of Korean
terrain.
Organization and Disposition
The army initially was organized along Chinese and Soviet concepts.
Over time, this organization has adjusted to the unique circumstances of
the military problem the KPA faces and to the evolution of North Korean
military doctrine and thought.
In the 1980s, the mechanized infantry and armored and artillery forces
were reorganized into new mechanized armored and artillery corps to implement
the change in strategic thinking. This restructuring suggests that some
infantry divisions were used to form the new mechanized forces and then
reformed, and that a similar pattern apparently was used to reconstruct
the armored corps.
Until 1986 most sources claimed the army had two armored divisions.
These divisions disappeared from the order of battle and were replaced
by the armored corps and a doubling of the armored brigade count. In the
mid-1980s, the heavy caliber selfpropelled artillery was consolidated into
the first multibrigade artillery corps. At the same time, the restructured
mobile exploitation forces were redeployed forward, closer to the DMZ.
The forward corps areas of operation were compressed although their internal
organization appeared to remain basically the same. The deployment of the
newly formed mechanized, armored, and artillery corps directly behind the
first echelon conventional forces provides a potent exploitation force
that did not exist prior to 1980.
As of 1992, the army was composed of sixteen corps commands, two separate
special operations forces commands, and nine military district commands
(or regions) under the control of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces)
(see table 9, Appendix). Most sources agree that North Korea's ground forces
consist of approximately 145 divisions and brigades, of which approximately
120 are active. There is less agreement, however, on the breakdown of the
forces.
In 1992 North Korea was divided among the conventional geographic corps
(see fig. 11). The army's armored and mechanized corps, composed of independent
combined arms brigades tailored to the restrictive terrain of the peninsula,
are positioned along the avenues of approach as exploitation and counterattack
forces.
Each province has, independent of the collocated conventional geographic
corps, a regional Military District Command dedicated to local defense,
which controls predominantly reserve forces organized into divisions and
brigades. The Military District Commands apparently were formed during
a restructuring of the reserves during the 1980s. Their command structure
is unclear, although they apparently control the local reserves, some regular
forces, and coastal defense units.
Weapons and Equipment
In the 1980s, in order to make the army more mobile and mechanized,
there was a steady influx of new tanks, selfpropelled artillery, armored
personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks. The ground forces seldom retire
old models of weapons and tend to maintain a large equipment stock, keeping
old models along with upgraded ones in the active force or in reserve.
Beginning in the late 1970s, North Korea began to produce a modified
version of the 115mm gunned T-62 tank, which was the Soviet army's main
battle tank in the 1960s. Based on general trends and photography of armed
forces parades, it is clear that North Korea has made considerable modifications
to the basic Soviet and Chinese designs in its own production.
Although the majority of units remain "straight-leg" infantry forces,
that is, lacking significant motorized or mechanized transport, the army
contains a significant number of well equipped mechanized units, with about
2,500 APCs. These mobile forces are equipped with a mix of older Soviet-made
APCs, some Chinese-made APCs, and some indigenously produced APCs, such
as the M-1985.
Probably because of its initial Soviet tutelage and the limited ground
attack capability of the air force, great emphasis is placed on using massive
artillery firepower. North Korean ordnance factories produce a variety
of self-propelled guns, howitzers, and gun-howitzers. In the 1980s, North
Korea produced a significant amount of self-propelled artillery, mating
towed artillery tubes with chassis already in the inventory. North Korean
strategic thought also seems to be based on the primacy of developing an
offensive capability, reflecting an appreciation for firepower probably
dating to the Korean War. Further, P'yongyang is willing to invest the
time and effort necessary for effective defense of its ground forces from
air attack and artillery fire.
With the exception of the 170mm M-1978 Koksan gun first noted in a parade
in 1985, a new turreted self-propelled gun observed in a 1992 parade, and
perhaps a few other systems, most artillery was developed from older Soviet
and Chinese designs. All incorporate proven technologies or components.
North Korea continues to produce a range of Soviet antitank guns, most
of them dating from 1940s and 1950s designs, and ranging in size from 57mm
through 100mm. Infantry units also are armed with Soviet bloc-derived equipment.
The army has an extensive facility hardening program. Almost all the
forward deployed artillery can be stored in wellprotected underground emplacements.
The passive defenses in the forward corps include a large bunker complex
to conceal and protect infantry forces, mechanized units, and war matériel
stockpiles.
Special Operations Forces
In the early 1990s, the army was made up of a mixture of conventional
and unconventional warfare forces. By any consideration, however, North
Korea has one of the world's largest special operations forces. Estimates
of the size of the army's special operations forces ranged from 60,000
persons to over 100,000 persons. The uncertainty over the number derives
from both the lack of information and the varying definitions of special
operations forces. Organized into twenty-two brigades and at least seven
independent battalions, the special operations forces are believed to be
the best trained and to have the highest morale of all North Korean ground
forces.
Special operations forces were developed to meet three basic requirements:
to breach the flankless fixed defense of South Korea; to create a "second
front" in the enemy's rear area, disrupting in-depth South Korean or United
States reinforcements and logistical support during a conflict; and to
conduct battlefield and strategic reconnaissance. The ultimate goal was
to create strategic dislocation. The additional missions of countering
opposing forces and internal security were added over time.
The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces controls the bulk of the special
operations forces through one of two commands, the Reconnaissance Bureau
and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. The Reconnaissance Bureau
is the primary organization within the Ministry of People's Armed Forces
for the collection of strategic and tactical intelligence. It also exercises
operational control over agents engaged in collecting military intelligence
and in the training and dispatch of unconventional warfare teams. The Light
Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is directly subordinate to the General
Staff Department. The party directly controls approximately 1,500 agents.
Operations are categorized on the basis of the echelon supported. Strategic
special operations forces support national or Ministry of People's Armed
Forces objectives, operationalsupported corps operations, and tactical-supported
maneuver divisions and brigades. Strategic missions of special operations
forces in support of national and Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives
involve reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations, but not light infantry
operations, which primarily are tactical operations. The main objectives
of these units are to secure information that cannot be achieved by other
means, neutralize targets, and disrupt rear areas. In executing these operations,
special operations troops may be disguised either as South Korean military
personnel or as civilians.
Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advance of hostilities
or in the initial stages by naval or air platforms. Based on available
insertion platforms, North Korea has a one-time lift capability of 12,000
persons by sea and 6,000 persons by air. Most North Korea special operations
forces infiltrate overland and are dedicated to operational and tactical
missions, that is, reconnaissance and combat operations in concert with
conventional operations in the forward corps. Although it is unknown how
forces will be allocated, limits on North Korea's insertion capabilities
constrain operational flexibility and determine the allocation of strategic,
operational, and tactical missions.
North Korean army special operations forces units are broken down into
three categories based on mission and mode of operation: agent operations,
reconnaissance, and light infantry and sniper. The Reconnaissance Bureau
has four sniper brigades and at least seven independent reconnaissance
battalions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau controls fourteen
light infantry/sniper brigades: six "straight-leg" brigades, six airborne
brigades, and two amphibious brigades. Four light infantry brigades of
unknown subordination are under the operational control of the forward
corps. In addition, each regular infantry division and mechanized brigade
has an special operations forces battalion.
Reconnaissance units are employed in rear area, strategic intelligence
collection, and target information acquisition. Light infantry units operate
in company- or battalion-sized units against military, political, or economic
targets. Sniper units are distinguished from light infantry units in that
their basic operational unit is the team, rather than the larger company
or battalion of the light infantry unit.
A reconnaissance brigade consists of between 3,600 and 4,200 personnel.
It is organized into a headquarters, rear support units, a communications
company, and ten reconnaissance battalions. The basic unit of operation
is the reconnaissance team, which has from two to ten men. A light infantry
brigade has between 3,300 and 3,600 personnel organized into between five
and ten battalions. The brigade can fight as a unit or disperse its battalions
for independent operations. A sniper brigade's organization parallels that
of the light infantry brigade.
The unique special operations forces dedicated to strategic operations
are the two amphibious light infantry/sniper brigades subordinate to the
Light Infantry Guidance Bureau. These brigades are believed deployed to
Wnsan on the east coast and Namp'o and Tasa-ri on the west coast. In organization
and manpower, they are reduced versions of the regular light infantry brigades.
The two brigades have a total strength of approximately 5,000 men in ten
battalions. Each battalion has about 400 men organized into five companies
each. Some amphibious brigade personnel are trained as frogmen.
In the 1970s, in support of overland insertion, North Korea began clandestine
tunneling operations along the entire DMZ, with two tunnels per forward
division. By 1990 four tunnels dug on historical invasion routes from the
north had been discovered by South Korean and United States tunnel neutralization
teams: three in the mid-1970s and the fourth in March 1990. The South Koreans
suspect there were as many as twenty-five tunnels in the early 1990s, but
the level of ongoing tunneling is unknown.
At the operational and tactical level, infiltration tactics are designed
for the leading special operations forces brigades to probe and penetrate
the weak points of the defense; disrupt the command, control, and communications
nodes; and threaten lines of communication and supply. To achieve its goal
of nearterm distraction and dislocation of the defender, at least one special
operations forces brigade is assigned to each of the four regular army
corps deployed along the DMZ./
Military Capability, Readiness, Training, and Recent Trends
Beginning in the late 1970s, North Korea began a major reorganization
and modernization of its ground forces. Between 1984 and 1992, the army
added about 1,000 tanks, over 2,500 APC/infantry fighting vehicles (IFV),
and about 6,000 artillery tubes or rocket launchers. In 1992 North Korea
had about twice the advantage in numbers of tanks and artillery, and a
1.5-to-1 advantage in personnel over its potential adversaries, the United
States-Republic of Korea defenses to the south. Over 60 percent of the
army was located within 100 kilometers of the DMZ in mid1993 .
North Korea conducts exercises at the division, corps, and Ministry
of People's Armed Forces levels, but almost no information was available
on their size, scope, frequency, or duration as of mid-1993. Province-level
defensive training measures are more common than large-scale training exercises.
Exercises involving units that consume scarce resources such as fuel, oil,
and lubricants occur even less frequently, inhibiting the readiness of
exploitation forces. Most training occurs at the regimental level or below,
mainly at the company and platoon levels. There may be integration difficulties
at division- and corps-level operations.
During the 1980s, doctrine and organization were revamped to increase
the lethality, speed, and combat power of the attack. The shifting of the
majority of the North Korean ground forces closer to the DMZ offers the
potential for a more rapid advance. The reorganization of P'yongyang's
exploitation forces in the 1980s suggests that initial attacking forces
will be reinforced by heavier and more mobile units to exploit any breakthroughs.
The North Korean army was not uniformly successful in its 1980s efforts
to modernize its forces in support of a high-speed offensive strategy;
more needs to be done to update the army's mobility, artillery, and air
defense elements. North Korea has increased its tank fleet, but incomplete
information suggests that it remains based largely on dated Soviet technology
with retrofitted indigenous improvements. Although the quality and quantity
of mobile anti-aircraft gun systems remains unknown, there is no indication
of any mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems other than man-portable
systems such as the SA-7 and SA14 or SA-16 (based on parade photographs)
entering the inventory to augment North Korea's static air defense umbrella.
Lack of SAM systems could be a major deficiency in the army's tactical
air defense capability during mobile offensive operations. However, in
artillery systems the army appears to have made the most of its limited
technological base. It has increased the artillery force while maintaining
relative quantitative and range superiorities over its potential southern
adversary and improving force mobility. In mid-1993 the chances that North
Korea will further modernize its forces appear limited. The technological
level of P'yongyang's industrial base appears to ensure that, with the
possible exception of narrow areas of special interest, built-in obsolescence
will be unavoidable, regardless of how undesirable.
Employment in Offensive Scenario
Source: Based on information from United States, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990,
Washington, 1991, 69.
The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of
allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national
power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive
and be deployed. Final war preparations most likely would not involve a
noticeable surge in military-related activity because almost two-thirds
of the ground forces and a significant amount of logistical support already
are concentrated in the forward area between P'yongyang and the DMZ. Immediately
preceding the initial infantry assault, North Korean artillery units would
attempt to saturate the firstechelon South Korean defense with preparatory
and continuous suppressive fire. North Korean infantry and armor elements
of the first-echelon divisions of the forward conventional corps would
attack selected narrow fronts to create gaps for the follow-on echelons.
The penetration would be supported by North Korean special operations forces.
At the same time, the KPA would launch several diversionary attacks in
order to confuse and disperse the defensive effort. The mechanized corps
would attempt to push through any gaps, bypass and isolate defenders, and
penetrate as deeply as possible into the strategic rear.
The overall objective of the breakout would be to disturb the coherence
of South Korea defenses in depth--including its key command, control, communications,
and intelligence infrastructure (C3I)--so as to disrupt any significant
counterattacks. In support of what would be primarily a ground war, the
navy might attempt to insert amphibious-trained special operations forces
on each coast or to secure the northern islands or support operations against
the Kimp'o Peninsula, across the Han River estuary near Seoul. In addition,
Scud and FROG missiles would be used during the assault to disrupt rear
areas and C3I. After initial naval support and supply, however, the navy's
limited capability to control the sea would leave embarked forces on their
own. Both the navy and the air force would be hard pressed to sustain a
level of offensive operations and would revert to a largely defensive role.
In order for the KPA's military strategy to succeed on the battlefield,
the KPA would have to achieve initial strategic surprise and execute its
operations quickly. The most critical period would probably be choosing
when and where to commit the mobile exploitation forces.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
The chuch'e ideology's emphasis on a self-sufficient state also extends
to military industry and sustainability. The Four Military Guidelines calls
for a military force capable of operating for an extended period without
external support or intervention.
For its level of technological and economic development, North Korea
has developed an impressive military-industrial complex and is nearly self-sufficient
in military production. However, because overall technological levels are
low, the military is incapable of producing aircraft, sophisticated radars,
or electronic equipment. But P'yongyang has been successful when it assigns
priority resources to specific projects.
North Korea is believed to have stockpiled enough ammunition, food,
and petroleum, oil, and lubricants in hardened, underground facilities
to sustain combat for several months without outside aid. According to
Seoul, by 1989 P'yongyang had stockpiled some 990,000 tons of ammunition--an
amount sufficient for four months of combat. It is also believed that despite
food and energy shortages in the late 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea
maintains significant national stockpiles for emergency military use.
Military Industry
North Korea's extensive defense production capability reflects its commitment
to self-reliance. Although most equipment is of Soviet or Chinese design,
P'yongyang has modified the original designs and produces both derivatives
and indigenously designed versions of armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, light tanks, and high-speed landing craft (see Relations with
the Third World , this ch.).
In mid-1993 North Korea had an impressive, if technologically dated,
military production capacity. Ground systems production included a complete
line of armored vehicles, field artillery, including a new turreted self-propelled
artillery piece first seen in April 1992, and crew- and individual-served
weapons. Naval construction included surface combatants up to 1,400 tons,
Romeo class submarines, air-cushioned vehicles, and a wide range of specialized
infiltration craft. Missile production included antitank guided missiles
(AT-3), SA-7 Grail (Soviet surface-to- air missiles produced at the Chongyul
Arms Plant), and possibly SA-14 or SA-16 follow-ons, possibly SA-2s, and
Scud-derived surface-to-surface missiles. Aircraft production was limited
to a partial spare parts and assembly capacity, assembly or coproduction
of the Mi-2 helicopter, and production of small trainers. Since the mid-1980s,
there has been speculation that North Korea's aircraft-related facility
at Panghyn would begin production of a jet combat aircraft--possibly a
MiG-21 derivative--but as of 1992 no production had occurred. In 1991 South
Korean sources believed North Korea might be able to produce its own fighters
by 1995. In 1993 two MiG-29s were assembled at the Panghyn plant from kits
supplied by Russia. Assembly was halted because of North Korea's inability
to pay for more parts.
In 1990 North Korea had some 134 arms factories, many of them completely
or partially concealed underground. These facilities produce ground service
arms, ammunition, armored vehicles, naval craft, aircraft (spares and subassemblies),
missiles, electronics, and possibly chemical-related materials. In addition,
some 115 nonmilitary factories have a dedicated wartime matériel production
mission.
North Korea's arms and munitions industry predate the Korean War. After
the war, North Korea began to expand its arms production base through licensing
agreements with the Soviet Union. North Korea initially depended on the
Soviet Union and China for licensed technology and complete industrial
plants. In the 1970s, North Korea was developing variants of standard Soviet
and Chinese equipment. Acquisitions from these two sources were augmented
beginning in the early 1970s by an outreach program aimed at acquiring
Western dual-use technology and equipment. This program included a wide
range of initiatives, from acquiring Japanese trucks and electronic gear
to obtaining Austrian forging equipment with gun barrel applications, to
purchasing United States-manufactured helicopters. North Korea compensates
for its limited research and development base by producing a range of more
basic systems in quantity.
The defense industrial base is difficult to assess accurately. P'yongyang
desires state-of-the-art technology, but is unable to obtain it. Older
weapons systems are obtainable, however, and North Korea is able to reverse
engineer major systems and to modify and improve on them. Nevertheless,
it still lags dramatically behind military state of the art because the
systems remain dated. Because of its uneven technological base, North Korea
apparently places the highest priority on quantity to make up for a lack
of quality.
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